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INTRODUCTION
The first decade of the new millennium is likely to be the worst decade in terms of employment and output growth in the United States since the end of the Second World War. Even ignoring the sharp contraction that occurred in the last two quarters, growth in output and employment during the 2000s has averaged at levels much lower than what was observed since the 1950s (see figure 1) . 
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Notes: The numbers are averages of quarterly growth rates from 1950:1 to 2009:1. Employment refers to total nonfarm employment (seasonally adjusted). Growth rates in real GDP are seasonally adjusted at annual rates. The data points labeled "2000s(1)" exclude the data for last two quarters. Source: Authors' calculations from BEA and BLS data.
The growth in the average wage also has been slower in the current decade as compared to the 1990s, as well as the two decades immediately following the Second World War. As we know, inequality in wage income was considerably higher during the last two decades compared to the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, the faster growth in the average wage during the later period was driven, to a large extent, by the big gains made by those at the higher rungs of the wage distribution. For the population as a whole, median family money income is a better indicator of economic well-being than the average wage. Similar to the trends in output and employment, trends in median family money income also point to the 2000s as the decade of worst performance since the Second World War (figure 2). However, the deterioration in the average growth rate appears to be much more drastic for median family income than for output or employment. 
Notes:
The numbers are averages of annual growth rates from 1950 to 2007. Average wage is the wage and salary accruals per full-time equivalent employee deflated by the price index for private consumption expenditures. Median family income is median income in current dollars deflated by the CPI-U (RS). Sources: Authors' calculations from BEA, BLS, and Census data.
The evidence presented above suggests that economic performance in terms of growth in output, employment, wages, and family income was generally poorer in the 2000s, even before the onset of the financial crisis from September 2008. The financial crisis and the accompanying global slump constitute the greatest threat to restoring growth rates of wages and family income to their levels in the 1990s. However, such a restoration is unlikely to emerge without a set of coherent macroeconomic and labor market policies that go beyond merely addressing the financial crisis and recession.
The administration of President Barack Obama inherited an economic mess that was quickly transforming into a deep economic malaise when it took office on January 20, 2009. With remarkable speed, the administration managed to sign into law a package of spending increases and tax cuts known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) on February 19, 2009 . According to the administration, the Act will create or save approximately 3.5 million jobs by the end of 2010. The transfers and tax cuts included in the Act are expected to provide relief to low-income and vulnerable households especially hurt by the economic crisis and, at the same time, support aggregate demand. Apart from playing the role of macroeconomic stabilization, the Act, in the words of the administration's recovery website, "will lay the foundation for a robust and sustainable 21st century economy" by "modernizing our health care, improving our schools, modernizing our infrastructure, and investing in the clean energy technologies of the future." 1 Our aim is to provide a preliminary assessment of the Act in terms of its likely impact on median household income, gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged population subgroups, and income inequality. A central motivation for evaluating the Act from this particular standpoint was articulated quite poignantly by President Obama himself in his historic inauguration speech: "The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart-not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good." The preliminary and tentative character of the exercise cannot be emphasized enough. Only a small fraction of the total appropriations made under the Act has actually been spent so far. The specific purposes for which different levels and agencies of government will spend substantial chunks of the monies are still to be determined. There is also uncertainty regarding the manner (i.e., in the form of loans or grants) in which a considerable portion of the money will be spent. The "known unknowns" about the Act itself impose a sizeable degree of tentativeness to any evaluation. In addition, the methods and data utilized in conducting our assessment are also bound to change in the future as we refine our methods and better information becomes available. Admittedly, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the construction of most future economic scenarios and ours is no exception.
METHODOLOGY
Our strategy toward assessing the implications of the Act consists of three main steps:
constructing a baseline scenario; estimating the increase in employment by industry and occupation due to ARRA; and simulating the accompanying effects of changes in earnings on the distribution of money income.
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In the first step, we constructed a baseline scenario of labor market conditions and distribution of income against which the effects of the Act can be assessed. Given that the main objectives of our study are related to the level and distribution of income, we adopted the latest Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC 2008) The predicted propensities were used to assign status to individuals, within cells constructed with industry, age, and sex. Second, the unemployed in the resulting data set were statistically matched with the January unemployed to transfer the duration of unemployment. The resulting data set was then augmented with income packages in three stages. In the first, earnings were multiply imputed using hot-decking for the labor force and chained equations for those not in the labor force. In the second stage, unemployment compensation, workmen's compensation, and disability payments were imputed using hot-decking with the results of the previous steps. In the third stage, means-tested transfers were imputed for families using hot-decking with the results of the prior steps.
Other sources of income were carried over without change from 2007 to 2008. Finally, all components of money income were "aged" according to external data for each component (e.g., unemployment compensation for each recipient was "aged" by using the percent change in unemployment compensation per beneficiary by region, calculated from the administrative data). The resulting baseline scenario is a multiply imputed dataset with complete labor force characteristics and income profiles for 2008.
Once the baseline scenario was constructed, we turned to confront the issues of estimating the effects of ARRA on income distribution, relative to the baseline scenario.
The only channel of influence that we consider here is the creation of new employment due to ARRA and the attendant effects on earnings, which, in turn, shapes total income (earnings plus all other money income). 4 Our approach may be described as "comparative-static" since we do not at all take into account how other changes in the economic environment would affect employment and income distribution in the current and future years. Therefore, our simulated effects of ARRA represent a "best-case The other two adjustments reflected considerations with respect to coverage and timing. We excluded some items that could not be considered (at least in a national accounting sense) as adding to aggregate demand (e.g., loans) and some items that could not be assigned appropriate multiplier effects (e.g., subsidies for information-technology improvements in healthcare). Finally, in order to focus on the near-term effects, we excluded budgetary costs that the CBO considered to be incurred only beyond 2011. The two adjustments due to coverage and timing differences reduced the CBO estimate of budgetary cost by 14.3 percent.
The fiscal stimulus was split among three main categories for the estimation of employment effects (table 2) . Following the conventional method, the impact of tax cuts, transfers, and subsidies on GDP were calculated using a set of multipliers that convert an additional dollar of government expenditure (or tax cut) into an increase in GDP. 7 For each tax cut and transfer, the CBO specifies the range of values for the multiplier ("low"
and "high" values). We performed estimation using the high value and the midpoint of 7 There is a great deal of controversy about the "appropriate" value of multipliers that fundamentally reflect deep-rooted differences among macroeconomic theories. For the administration's approach, see Romer and Bernstein (2009) A different method, based on input-output analysis, was adopted for estimating the employment effect of government purchases of goods and services. The increase in government purchases was distributed across the final demand for the products of the 201 industries in the 2006 input-output table. We employed two alternative assumptions about the distribution of the increase in final demand across industries. Under one assumption, which reflects current input-output and national accounting conventions, the increase is distributed among the government industries in the table.
9 Below, we refer to this assumption as the "government" assumption. The alternative assumption involves distributing the increase in final demand across government and private industries, with the latter capturing most of the increase and government industries receiving only outlays that are destined for tasks that, under the current institutional arrangements, are essentially performed by government bodies. This assumption, called the "private" assumption, reflects the older national accounting view that government is solely a consumer, rather than the current view that regards government as a consumer and producer.
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In input-output analysis, the employment multiplier matrix provides the link between increase in final demand and employment. The matrix shows direct and indirect impacts of changes in final demand on employment due to inter-industry linkages. For instance, final demand increase on construction translates into increasing demand for inputs produced by other industries in the economy and, in turn, raises labor demand for both construction and input suppliers. In this exercise, the fiscal stimulus generates an initial, direct boost of final demand for goods and services produced by industries classified under two different assumptions. Indirect impacts follow via inter-industry transactions of intermediate inputs.
To account for the domestic employment impact of the Act, we exclude job impacts on the foreign economy from which some of the inputs are imported.
The employment estimates generated by the conventional and input-output methods were combined to form the total additional employment resulting from the stimulus in each industry. It is reasonable to expect that the employment effects will vary not just across industries, but also across occupations. We assumed that the additional employment created by the ARRA would be split across occupations in each industry in the same proportions that it was split in 2006. The latter proportions were taken from the occupation-industry matrix created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
In the final step, we assumed that the additional demand for labor created by the stimulus would be met by an increased supply of labor from the pool of "employable" individuals in the ASEC. The employable pool consisted of individuals (16 years and older) who were deemed to be currently (that is, as of January 2009) not working.
Additionally, we excluded individuals who did not work at all in 2007 and gave the reason for not working as being retired, ill, disabled, taking care of family, or, for those under twenty years of age, in school.
For each of the scenarios, the newly created jobs were distributed by industry and occupation. In order to accomplish the assignment, we created a ranking for each individual of occupations and industries by likelihood of being employed in each. The method was to estimate a multinomial probit regression for industry and occupation and then predict probabilities for each. 11 For each individual, industries and occupations were ranked based on highest propensity. Then we estimated likelihood of being employed for each individual, using a probit procedure. 12 With these three sets of information for each individual, we assigned employment status to those not already employed in the baseline scenario using an iterative procedure, stepping through industry and occupation pairs, selecting those most likely to be employed from among those most likely to be employed in that industry-occupation pair, until all the available jobs are assigned. Once we have assigned jobs, we reassign earnings to those individuals who received a new job. Once again, the method is hot-decking. Other components of money income remain unchanged for the final scenarios.
FINDINGS
We begin by discussing job creation under ARRA. Then, estimates of the new jobs among industries, occupations, and demographic groups are presented. Finally, we turn to the likely impact of the additional employment on median household income, income disparities among population subgroups, and income inequality.
A. Estimates of Job Creation
As discussed before, we estimated the potential additional employment from the stimulus under two sets of values for the multipliers for transfers, taxes, and subsidies ("high" and "medium"), and under two assumptions regarding the industrial distribution of final demand generated by government purchases ("government" and "private"). The combination of assumptions produces four scenarios. Our estimates of new jobs are shown in figure 3 , along with the estimates by the CBO and the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). It is a remarkable coincidence that the estimates of new jobs under our "medium" scenarios are nearly identical to the estimate by the administration. In our view, this finding casts considerable cloud over the charge made by Cogan et al. (2009) that the administration's estimates are not robust. We used a substantially different methodology and set of assumptions to derive our results, yet the additional employment resulting from two of our scenarios is indistinguishable from the administration's estimate. Of course, this congruence is no guarantee that the "reality" is more likely to match the scenario. 14 Given that a sizeable decline in employment is likely to occur during the period of projection, even the potential employment from our "high" scenario estimates (8.6 to 8.8 million) or that of the CBO (7.7 million) will largely have a palliative, rather than a curative, effect on the employment crisis (figure 4). 13 We place the word "reality" in quotes because the additional employment created by the ARRA cannot be calculated precisely, even in the future. While the direct employment effect can be quantified post factum, indirect employment due to the backward linkages generated by additional final demand from government purchases, as well as the employment effects generated by tax cuts and transfers, will necessarily have to be estimated from economic models. 14 Estimates are based on seasonally unadjusted monthly figures. While the ameliorating effect of the stimulus plan on the employment situation is surely welcome, it appears that the government could have achieved more at the same cost. As shown in table 2, roughly 55 percent of the fiscal stimulus over the period 2009-2011 will be delivered via tax cuts. In accordance with the general macroeconomic consensus, we found that the amount of stimulus required per new job created was much higher for taxes than outlays under all scenarios. Each additional job would cost approximately $69,000 in tax cuts versus $52,000 in spending increases in the "medium" scenarios and $110,000 versus $69,000 in the "high" scenarios.
B. Job Creation by Industry, Occupation, and Demographic Characteristics
The industrial composition of the additional employment under alternative assumptions regarding the industrial distribution of final demand is shown in table 3. 15 As one would expect, the most notable difference is the much lower share of government employment under the "private" assumption compared to the "government" assumption (19.2 versus 28.8 percent). The much higher share of construction (9.5 versus 5.4 percent)
accompanies the lower share of government under the "private" assumption. In turn, this reflects the substantial investments made in the stimulus package for improving the nation's infrastructure and structures under public ownership or control. Smaller increases, relative to the "government" assumption, can also be observed for the shares of the education and health services, as well as professional and business services. 16 Under both assumptions, the government sector will be the largest employer, 17 followed by professional and business services, and education and health services.
15 Our estimates of industrial composition did not change much in response to assumptions about the values of the multipliers. 16 Education and health services industry also include the social assistance industry. It should be noted that under both assumptions public education was treated as a part of government production. The higher share of employment in this industry under the private assumption is partly due to the fact the final demand assigned is higher by $9.3 billion. Community block grants for child development, public housing support, and employment and training services are included in the relevant industries (education and social assistance) under the private assumption. However, under the government assumption, the items are assigned to general government. In addition, the direct job impact is greater than the indirect impact by approximately three to one. Combining these two aspects leads to higher job creation in the sectors under the private assumption. 17 State and local government would account for 82 to 90 percent of the jobs created in the government sector. For the sake of comparison, we also report the estimates from Romer and Bernstein estimate the shares of construction, retail trade, and leisure and hospitality to be far higher than us. It is not obvious why such a large proportion of employment created by ARRA should fall in the latter two industries.
We estimate that the additional employment generated by ARRA would favor blue-collar and low-end service occupations relative to other occupations ( The occupations favored by ARRA pay, on the average, wages that are considerably below the wages in the other occupations. Compared to the average weekly earnings of workers in blue-collar occupations, those in managerial, professional, and high-end service occupations earned, respectively, 79, 67, and 11 percent more in 2008. A similar comparison for low-end service workers show that the gaps were even higher: employees in managerial, professional, and high-end service occupations earned, respectively, 120, 106, and 36 percent more in average weekly earnings in 2008. 18 We can, therefore, expect the additional employment created by the ARRA to benefit workers on the bottom rungs of the earnings distribution-an outcome that could have a favorable effect on the distribution of household money income, as we discuss later. Note: Occupational effects reported in the table were calculated with "medium" values for multipliers. "Managers" include "management, business, and financial" occupations. "Professionals" include "computer and mathematical science; architecture and engineering; life, physical, and social science; legal; and, healthcare practitioner and technical" occupations. "High-end" services include "community and social service; education, training, and library; arts, design, and entertainment; and healthcare support" occupations. "Low-end" services include "protective service; food preparation and serving; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; personal care and service; sales and related; and office and administrative support" occupations. "Production" include "farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and extraction; installation, maintenance, and repair; production; and transportation and material moving" occupations. Source: Author's calculations 18 We calculated weekly earnings by occupational groups from the monthly outgoing rotations of the 2008 CPS. Asian than white or Asian, more college-educated than not college educated, and more likely to be older than 60 than under 60.
Occupation

Table 5. Demographic Composition of Baseline and ARRA Employment (in percent)
The pool from which we selected job recipients consisted of those individuals who were not employed in the baseline, with the exception of all those who were listed as not working because they were disabled, retired, homemakers, or in school in 2007. Of those reporting in-school status, only those under the age of twenty were left out of the 19 We present all four scenarios in this case because, unlike our estimates of industrial and occupational composition, the estimates of demographic composition proved to be somewhat sensitive to the value of the multipliers. Thus, in our assignment, males were likelier than females to be selected for job recipiency. The racial composition of our pool was 62.4 percent white and 37.6 percent nonwhite. Whites were more likely to be selected in the "high" scenarios than their presence in the pool would indicate and less likely in the "medium" scenarios. The opposite is true for nonwhites. In terms of educational attainment, 21.9 percent of the pool had less than a high school diploma, 32.6 percent were high school graduates, and 30.7 percent had some college, while 14.9 percent were college graduates. Thus, those with a high school degree or less were much less likely to be job gainers in any scenario than their presence in the pool would indicate, while those with at least some college were more likely. Finally, in terms of age, those less than 25 were less likely, while those over 60 were more likely, and those of prime age were much more likely to be job recipients than their respective shares of the pool would indicate. In sum, we can say that, compared to their shares in the employable pool, the stimulus favors men over women, the college educated over those without any college, and prime age over younger workers. 20 Consider, for example, a society with two mutually exclusive groups, one of which is completely excluded from employment due to discrimination. If a government program to combat job losses created jobs only for those who were employed previously, then it would reinforce the existing system of discrimination.
(1) that are expected to persist for some time. They also assume the additional employment from the stimulus is created instantaneously.
We already pointed out that the job losses from the onset of the recession until March 2009 exceed the administration's estimates of job creation due to ARRA and our estimate under two scenarios (figure 3). However, there appears to be some differences among groups. The jobs created for women are likely to be more than the jobs they have lost so far in the current recession and, consequently, their resulting level of employment will be slightly higher than at the start of the recession as a result of ARRA. Among the racial groups, whites lose ground in employment relative to the start of the recession even with the ARRA, while nonwhites make no significant gain. Individuals who have not graduated from high school will suffer the largest loss, even after accounting for the employment gains from ARRA, followed by those with just a high school degree.
C. Effects on Earnings and Household Income
In this section we focus on the scenario that resulted in an estimate of the aggregate employment effect that was closest to the estimate of the administration (approximately 6.2 million new jobs). This scenario was described earlier as the "government-medium" scenario (see figure 1) , reflecting the assumptions made regarding the industrial distribution of additional final demand generated by government purchases and the values of multipliers attached to transfers and taxes. As discussed in the methodology section, once we assigned the ARRA jobs to the employable pool of individuals, we also estimated their annual earnings. The annual earnings of the newly employed individuals were added to the annual incomes of other individuals in the household to obtain the new level of household income.
21
Our estimates suggest that the average annual earnings for individuals employed in the ARRA jobs are likely to be higher than the baseline earnings (i.e., annual earnings of earners in non-ARRA jobs) by about 3 percent. Combining both groups of earners produces a level of earnings that is 0.7 percent higher than the baseline (table 7, the last entry under the column "with ARRA employment"). Turning to earners in different subgroups, the most striking increase is for workers in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution. The average earnings in the bottom quintile of the ARRA earnings distribution are estimated to be 11.9 percent higher than the baseline bottom quintile.
Caution in interpreting this number is advised, however. The baseline bottom quintile contains a significant number of individuals with negative earnings, while this is not true for the individuals added to the bottom earnings quintile as a result of ARRA job recipiency. We can see, in general, that the effect of the ARRA is to raise the lower end of the earnings distribution. In addition, average earnings for women increase a bit more than for men, although this increase is small compared to the earnings gap. The same can be said of the ARRA's impact on the white/nonwhite earnings gap. Finally, the ARRA seems to be a greater gain for those who are high school, but not college, graduates, although this boost will do little to shrink the gap between these groups and college graduates. The administration has estimated that the likely impact of the ARRA will be to boost the average money income of the middle quintile of working age families 22 by 2.3
22 Families with family heads aged 25 to 64 years are defined as working-age families. Given the demographic differences that we observed earlier regarding the effects of earnings growth under ARRA, it is useful to examine how much of the favorable change in earnings translates into differential growth in household income (relative to the baseline) among groups of households (table 8) . Consistent with our findings regarding the likely effects on earnings, we find that household income growth under ARRA is likely to favor nonwhites as opposed to whites. There does not appear to be much difference in expected income growth among households in different educational groups, except for college graduates who are estimated to receive a lower boost in household income-a finding that mirrors our earlier finding that the mean earnings of college graduates are likely to be lower with the ARRA jobs. Families headed by single females are likely to experience a higher income growth than married-couple families, again a probable result of the expected higher earnings growth for females relative to males under ARRA. The expected movements in money income generated by the ARRA generally appear to favor the groups usually considered as disadvantaged. However, the likely size of the movements is bound to make no appreciable dent in the substantial disparities in money income that exist between the groups (figure 8 
CONCLUSION
Our aim was to provide an appraisal of the effect of ARRA on the distribution of household income. The only channel of influence that we analyzed was the employment channel, i.e., the additional employment created by ARRA, the likely earnings of the newly employed individuals, and the changes in household income stemming from the additional earnings. Such an exercise is a comparative-static exercise, i.e., it ignores other changes in economic conditions that are bound to affect employment, earnings, and income. It is also, by its very nature, speculative. We have attempted to ground our speculations on what appears to us as the best available information and methods, but it is quite likely that several of the estimates presented here will be revised in the future as better information becomes available. holds for the bottom two quintiles also-their average money income after incorporating the effects of ARRA is likely to be lower than in 1999 and 2000. In sum, the bottom 60 percent of households are unlikely to see any notable improvement in their money income as a result of ARRA. As for the top two quintiles, it seems that they are unlikely to suffer any setbacks in their relative or absolute income. Finally, we found that it is unlikely that the ARRA will have any palpable effect on redressing the substantial gaps in money income that exist between nonwhites and whites, single-female headed families and married couples, and less-educated and college graduates.
Our analysis points toward the necessity of a comprehensive employment strategy that goes well beyond the ARRA. The need for public provisioning of various sorts (ranging from early childhood education centers to public health facilities to "greening" of public transportation), coupled with the severe underutilization of labor naturally suggests an expanded role for public employment as a desirable ingredient of an alternative strategy.
Government policies and priorities have to be radically refashioned to place the country on a sustainable and equitable growth path. The unfolding logic of the current crisis should be seen as an opportunity to push for a different set of institutional and economic arrangements that put people before profits. As history has shown, the required momentum for such a transformation is unlikely to come from the benevolence of rulers alone-irrespective of how well intentioned they might be. It can only come through popular mobilization and collective action.
APPENDIX A. STATE FISCAL STABILIZATION AND STATE FISCAL RELIEF
The results presented in the main text are based on the assumption that the fiscal stimulus imparted by ARRA excludes the funds in the Act for ameliorating the projected shortfalls in state and local budgets. We made this assumption because our framework is purely designed to assess the impact of ARRA on employment and income relative to, respectively, January 2009 and calendar year 2008. In a fully articulated macroeconomic model that includes the expected reductions in aggregate demand due to the fiscal contraction at the subnational level, it is necessary to also include the funds set aside in the Act that could play a compensating role. The estimates of job creation by the administration and the CBO (see figure 1 , main text) are based on including the latter amount in the fiscal stimulus. Our aim in this appendix is to present, purely for illustrative purposes, how the key estimates of the changes in employment and median household income presented in the main text of the report would be altered as a result of including the funds in the fiscal stimulus. increases from approximately $531 to $672 billion, or by 26 percent (table 2A; note that the tables and figures in the appendix are numbered so as to facilitate easy comparison 25 The full set of estimates and discussion will be available in a forthcoming working paper. and local governments, and assumed it to have a multiplier of 1.9 ("high") or 1.3
("medium"). The remainder of the increase is mainly due to the enhanced funding for public education (State Fiscal Stabilization). We considered this as an increase in the final demand for the government industries in the input-output table, consistent with our approach to government purchases of goods and services. 
Million
As we would expect, the additional employment resulting from ARRA is higher when State Fiscal Funds are included in the fiscal stimulus ( figure 3A) . 27 In fact, the In comparison with the employment situation at the start of the recession, the high-end estimate of employment generated by the ARRA with State Fiscal Funds was about 0.03 percent higher and the low-end estimate was 0.01 percent higher. Given that further job losses are likely during the period of projection, we think it is reasonable to maintain roughly the same conclusion arrived in the main text: the effect of ARRA on aggregate employment will be mostly (a partial) replacement of lost employment. The higher level of employment resulting from the inclusion of State Fiscal Funds will, as one would expect, boost household income, relative to the situation when fiscal funds were excluded, via increasing the amount of earnings assigned to the newly employed. This expectation is confirmed in the results shown in figure 6A . If we include all the State Fiscal Funds and assume high values for employment multipliers, median household income will be 3.3 percent higher than in the baseline (bar labeled "2008-ARRA1"). In this case, the forecasted decline in 2008 will be overcome fully and household income will return to a level that is 0.5 percent higher than in 1999. Under the less unrealistic assumption of medium values for employment multipliers, median household income will be about 2.3 percent higher than in the baseline and 0.5 percent lower than in 1999.
